Analysis of the Impact of the Housing Voucher System on Leading Real Estate Enterprises and the Effectiveness of Resolving Liquidity Difficulties

The discussion focuses on the impact of the Housing Voucher System as a real estate stimulus policy. The core view is that this system is a “nuclear explosion-level positive” and can directly inject liquidity, which is better than interest rate cuts. However, after verification:

1. Policy Authenticity
   : Reports that first-tier cities such as Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Guangzhou have officially launched the Housing Voucher System have not been confirmed [1][2][3][4], and the policy may be in the pilot or planning stage.
2. Circulation Verification
   : The claim that demolition households transfer housing vouchers lacks support from actual cases [1][2][3][4], so the circulation of housing vouchers is questionable.
3. Market Status
   : Poly Developments’ stock price has fallen 27.88% YTD in 2025, below the moving averages of various cycles, with a P/E of -84.14x and ROE of -0.45%, showing weak profitability [0]; Greentown China’s stock price rose 37.8% YTD in February 2025 due to sales growth [5], but the overall real estate market still faces liquidity difficulties such as high inventory (27-month cycle), declining sales, and developer defaults [2][3][4].

1. Uncertainty of Policy Effect
   : The “nuclear explosion-level” positive evaluation of the Housing Voucher System is based on unconfirmed policy assumptions and ignores obstacles such as credit support and market acceptance that may be encountered during implementation.
2. Differentiation of Housing Enterprise Fundamentals
   : Leading real estate enterprises show large differences in performance. Greentown China benefits from short-term sales growth, while Poly Developments is more affected by its own financial conditions and market environment, and currently does not reflect the actual impact of the Housing Voucher System.
3. Nature of Liquidity Difficulties
   : The current market difficulties stem from long-term supply-demand imbalance and credit contraction. A single Housing Voucher System may be difficult to completely solve the problem, and it needs to be combined with supply-side reforms and financing channel repairs.

• Policy implementation falls short of expectations, and market sentiment may decline.
• If the Housing Voucher System is improperly implemented, it may trigger new credit risks and market distortions.
• Housing enterprises’ fundamentals continue to be under pressure, and performance improvement still takes time.

• If the Housing Voucher System is successfully implemented, it may stimulate demand in the short term and improve de-stocking pressure.
• Leading real estate enterprises, relying on brand and resource advantages, may be the first to benefit from policy dividends.

1. The Housing Voucher System has not been widely implemented in first-tier cities, and relevant optimistic views lack factual support.
2. Current fundamentals and stock prices of leading real estate enterprises are mainly affected by their own financial conditions and the overall market environment.
3. The liquidity difficulties in the real estate market require comprehensive policy responses, and a single system is difficult to completely solve.
4. Investors should pay attention to the actual effect of policy implementation and the improvement of housing enterprises’ fundamentals, and carefully evaluate the rationality of optimistic expectations.