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Deep Analysis of Pop Mart's IP Operation Model: Can It Replicate Tencent Games' Evergreen Growth Path?

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December 28, 2025

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Deep Analysis of Pop Mart's IP Operation Model: Can It Replicate Tencent Games' Evergreen Growth Path?

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Deep Analysis of Pop Mart’s IP Operation Model: Can It Replicate Tencent Games’ Evergreen Growth Path?
Core Conclusion: Leap from ‘Betting on Hits’ to ‘Systematic Success’

Based on the latest 2025 financial report data and market analysis, my core judgment is:

Pop Mart’s IP operation model has initially具备了 Tencent Games-style systematic capabilities for producing evergreen IPs, but there are fundamental differences in their implementation paths
. Through building a closed-loop full industry chain of ‘artist discovery-IP incubation-hierarchical operation-global sales’, Pop Mart converts the ‘uncertainty of hit products’ in the creative industry into manageable and replicable ‘systematic success probability’.


I. Labubu vs Honor of Kings: Comparative Analysis of Phenomenal IPs
1.1 Comparison of Explosive Growth Speed and Commercial Performance

THE MONSTERS (Labubu)
's explosive growth:

  • H1 2025 revenue reached 4.814 billion yuan, a year-on-year surge of
    668%
    , accounting for
    34.7%
    of total revenue [1]
  • Soared from 627 million yuan in H1 2024 to 4.814 billion yuan in H1 2025, growing nearly 7 times in just one year
  • Half-year revenue of a single IP approached 5 billion yuan, exceeding 75% of Pop Mart’s total annual revenue in 2023
  • Created a myth of hidden editions being scalped to a ‘sky-high price’ of 1.08 million yuan in the secondary market; although prices have dropped significantly, it successfully achieved brand出圈 (going viral beyond its niche)

Honor of Kings
’ evergreen performance:

  • Launched in 2015, has been in operation for
    10 years
    , with daily average revenue exceeding
    100 million yuan
    and daily active users over
    100 million
    [2]
  • Skin system contributes over
    50%
    of revenue, and user lifetime value (LTV) is
    3-5 times
    that of similar games [2]
  • Maintains long-term user stickiness through continuous content updates, esports events, and social ecology, achieving true ‘evergreen growth’
1.2 Core Differences in Business Models

Pop Mart IP Operation Analysis

The chart shows the revenue comparison of Pop Mart’s top five IPs. It can be seen that THE MONSTERS’ revenue in H1 2025 far exceeded other IPs, reaching 4.814 billion yuan, while MOLLY, SKULLPANDA, CRYBABY, and DIMOO achieved 1.357 billion yuan, 1.221 billion yuan, 1.218 billion yuan, and 1.105 billion yuan respectively. The top five IPs accounted for 79.4% of total artist IP revenue, indicating that Pop Mart has shifted from relying on a single MOLLY IP to a multi-IP matrix with multiple growth points.

Key Differences
:

  • Tencent Games
    : Virtual content × social fission × scale effect, relying on user interaction and competition to maintain long-term popularity
  • Pop Mart
    : Physical products × emotional value × scarcity premium, maintaining popularity through collection attributes and secondary market speculation

II. Comparison of IP Operation Models: Similarities in Systematic Capabilities
2.1 Common Ground: Closed-Loop Full Industry Chain and IP Hierarchical System

Pop Mart vs Tencent Games Comparison

The chart compares the core capabilities of Pop Mart and Tencent Games from six dimensions. It can be seen that Tencent Games is stronger in social ecology, user stickiness, and lifecycle management, while Pop Mart performs well in IP incubation capability and monetization efficiency.

Striking Similarities Between the Two
:

  1. S/A/B/C Dynamic IP Hierarchical System

    • Tencent: S-level (annual revenue >10 billion yuan), A-level (5-10 billion yuan), B-level (2-5 billion yuan), C-level (0.5-2 billion yuan)
    • Pop Mart: S-level (annual revenue >5 billion yuan, THE MONSTERS), A-level (1-5 billion yuan, MOLLY/SP/CRYBABY/DIMOO), B-level (300 million-1 billion yuan), C-level (<300 million yuan)
    • Both dynamically allocate resources based on market feedback to maximize the value of successful IPs and timely stop losses for underperforming IPs [3]
  2. Closed-Loop Full Industry Chain

    • Tencent: Game R&D studio group → distribution and operation system → social traffic channels (WeChat/QQ)
    • Pop Mart: Artist discovery (PTS International Trend Toy Exhibition) → design and production → omni-channel sales (stores + robots + online)
    • No obvious weaknesses in the business chain, forming a positive cycle of ‘larger scale → stronger barriers’ [3]
  3. Multi-IP Matrix to Smooth Cycle Fluctuations

    • Tencent has 14 evergreen games with annual revenue exceeding 4 billion yuan
    • Pop Mart had
      13 IPs with revenue exceeding 100 million yuan
      in H1 2025; the top five IPs accounted for 79.4% of revenue, but it has shifted from single MOLLY dependence to multi-point growth [1]
2.2 Core Differences: Commercial Essence of Virtual vs Physical
Dimension Tencent Games Pop Mart
Product Form
Virtual digital goods Physical products
Core Driving Force
Social fission × competitive confrontation Emotional value × collection attributes
User LTV
300-500 yuan/year, repurchase rate 60-70% Average spending per customer:50-300 yuan, repurchase rate:50-60%
Evergreen Mechanism
PVP real-time competition × season mechanism × UGC ecology Scarcity premium × secondary market speculation × cultural identity
Marginal Cost
Almost zero, strong scale effect Fixed production cost, but high inventory risk

III. Can Pop Mart Achieve Tencent-Style Evergreen Growth? My Judgment
3.1 Positive Factors Supporting Evergreen Growth

1. Systematic IP Incubation Capability Has Been Verified

  • MOLLY’s emergence in 2016 → THE MONSTERS’ explosion in 2023 → CRYBABY,小野 (Xiaoye), 星星人 (Xingxingren) and others taking over
  • Successfully built 5 S/A-level IPs with annual revenue exceeding 1 billion yuan in 7 years, proving this is not ‘accidental luck’ but
    replicable systematic capability
    [1]
  • Artist IP revenue soared from 3.688 billion yuan in H1 2024 to 12.229 billion yuan in H1 2025, an increase of
    231.6%
    , accounting for
    88.1%
    of total revenue [1]

2. Data-Driven IP Operation System

  • Through high-frequency new product launches via blind box machines, mini-programs, and live streaming rooms, shortening the new product launch frequency from ‘monthly’ to ‘weekly’
  • Member private domain operation, using marketing methods like ‘countdown to launch’ and ‘unannounced launch’ to accurately grasp user psychology
  • 30 million member system with 58% repurchase rate, forming a stable user base

3. Global Expansion Opens New Space

  • Overseas revenue reached 5.59 billion yuan in H1 2025, accounting for
    40%
    of total revenue, with year-on-year growth of
    1142.3%
    (Americas) and
    729.2%
    (Europe) [1]
  • Asia-Pacific region grew by 257.8%, with 88 global stores covering 14 countries
  • Overseas average spending per customer is
    1.8 times
    that of the domestic market, with stronger profitability

4. IP Ecologization Is Advancing

  • Exploring city parks, game collaborations, and film/TV content to enter the larger IP derivative market (domestic IP-licensed merchandise retail totaled 155.09 billion yuan in 2024)
  • Referencing the ‘reverse Disney’ path: first build brand and user base through products, then reverse-fill content and experiences
3.2 Challenges and Risks Faced

1. Uncertainty in IP Lifecycle Management

  • THE MONSTERS (Labubu) from phenomenal explosion to significant price drop in the secondary market, exposing the
    ‘availability paradox’
    : after expanding production capacity, scarcity premium disappears, and IP quickly transitions from trend product to mass consumer goods [5]
  • Deutsche Bank warned that Labubu is rapidly transitioning from a scarce trend IP to mass consumer goods, and scarcity premium is disappearing [5]
  • Tencent’s Honor of Kings maintains 10-year evergreen growth through social competition and UGC ecology, while Pop Mart’s IP lifecycle is currently only
    2-3 years

2. Aesthetic Fatigue and User Changes

  • Generation Z preferences change rapidly, and the social attribute of blind boxes is weakening
  • Although consumers aged 30-45 have an average spending per customer 40% higher than Generation Z, whether they can continue to attract new users is questionable
  • Trend toys are directly linked to the ‘emotional consumption’ of young groups, and the volatility of emotions determines the uncertainty of IP lifecycle [4]

3. Valuation and Performance Divergence

  • H1 2025 revenue reached 13.876 billion yuan (year-on-year +204.4%), net profit 4.574 billion yuan (year-on-year +396.5%), exceeding full-year 2024 performance [1]
  • However, the stock price dropped 43% from the August high of HKD339.8 to HKD192.9 on December 19, with market value evaporating
    HKD197.2 billion
    [5]
  • This reflects the market’s deep concern about growth sustainability: investors question ‘whether high growth can continue’ and ‘where the next Labubu will come from’

4. Overseas Expansion Risks

  • Multiple challenges such as cultural adaptation, supply chain management, and cost control
  • Although current growth rate is astonishing (Americas +1142%, Europe +729%), the base is small, and whether high growth can be sustained is questionable
  • Morgan Stanley predicts that Pop Mart’s revenue growth rate will slow significantly in 2026, transitioning from ‘explosive growth’ to ‘sustainable growth’ [5]

IV. Investment Logic and Valuation Framework Reconstruction for Trend Toy Track
4.1 Limitations of Traditional Valuation Framework

Traditional Valuation Methods (2020-2023)
:

  • Valuation logic: Single consumer goods company, PEG/PE relative valuation
  • Core assumptions: Blind box dividend continues, single MOLLY dependence
  • Main risks: Aesthetic fatigue, regulatory policies
  • Typical PE: 30-50x

Problems
:

  • Ignores IP ecological value (IP derivative market size of 155 billion yuan)
  • Underestimates globalization potential (overseas revenue share from 3.38% →40%)
  • Fails to reflect certainty premium brought by systematic operation capabilities
4.2 New Valuation Framework: From ‘Blind Box Company’ to ‘IP Ecological Platform’

Trend Toy Track Valuation Framework Reconstruction

The chart shows China’s trend toy market size growing from 22.9 billion yuan in 2020 to an estimated 87.7 billion yuan in 2025, with a CAGR of 35.1%. Pop Mart’s market share also increased from 8.5% to an estimated 17.5%, showing strong market expansion capability.

Three-Stage Valuation Model
:

【Core Business Valuation】(PE:40-50x)

  • Domestic mature market (2025E revenue:20 billion yuan) × PE40x = HKD800 billion
  • Overseas high-growth market (2025E revenue:10 billion yuan, growth rate +200%) × PE60x = HKD600 billion
  • Total core business valuation: HKD1.4 trillion

【IP Ecological Premium】(PS:3-5x)

  • Park business (2025E revenue:1 billion yuan) × PS5x = HKD5 billion
  • Game and content collaboration (2025E revenue:500 million yuan) × PS8x = HKD4 billion
  • Co-branding and licensing (2025E revenue:1.5 billion yuan) × PS5x = HKD7.5 billion
  • Total IP ecological valuation: HKD16.5 billion

【Global Growth Option】(Option Value)

  • Successful scenario (overseas revenue share:80%): +HKD300 billion
  • Neutral scenario (overseas revenue share:60%): +HKD150 billion
  • Failure scenario (overseas revenue share:40%): +HKD0 billion

【Comprehensive Valuation Range】

  • Current market value: HKD377.1 billion (December 2025, stock price HKD200)
  • Target market value: HKD800-1200 billion
  • Upside potential:
    112%-218%
4.3 Key Valuation Indicator Reconstruction

Traditional Indicators → New Indicators
:

Traditional Indicator New Indicator 2025 Target
PE Multiple IP Incubation Success Rate ≥2 new S/A-level IPs per year
Revenue Growth Rate Overseas Revenue Share 40% →60% →80%
Gross Margin Member ARPU 300 yuan →400 yuan →500 yuan
Same-Store Growth IP Derivative Revenue Share <5% →10% →20%
Store Count Global Brand Influence Selected into Time Magazine’s 100 Most Influential Companies in the World (achieved)
4.4 Comparable Company Valuation Reference
  • Disney
    : PE45x (mature IP ecology, closed-loop of film + park + derivatives)
  • Sanrio
    : PE50x (classic IPs like Hello Kitty, IP licensing为主)
  • Bandai Namco
    : PE30x (toys + game IPs like Gundam)
  • Hasbro
    : PE15x (traditional IPs like Transformers, slow growth)

Pop Mart
: Current PE35x → Target PE40-50x (benchmarking Disney and Sanrio)


V. Investment Advice and Risk Warnings
5.1 Core Investment Logic Reconstruction

Layer 1: IP Incubation and Operation Capability
(Value Share:40%)

  • ✓ Artist discovery network (International Trend Toy Exhibition PTS)
  • ✓ IP hierarchical operation system (S/A/B/C dynamic adjustment)
  • ✓ Design and supply chain industrialization (sketch →3D →mass production)
  • ✓ Data-driven IP operation decisions

Layer 2: Omni-Channel Sales Network
(Value Share:30%)

  • ✓ China: Saturated first- and second-tier cities, space in sinking markets
  • ✓ Overseas: Explosive growth in Asia-Pacific/Americas/Europe
  • ✓ Online: Blind box machines + Douyin + Xiaohongshu private domain
  • ✓ Offline: Landmark stores + robot shops + parks

Layer3: IP Ecological Expansion
(Value Share:30%)

  • ✓ Short-term: Category expansion (plush, mecha, assembly)
  • ✓ Medium-term: Content filling (animation, games, film/TV)
  • ✓ Long-term: Park economy, co-branding licensing, IP derivatives

###5.2 Key Hypothesis Verification Points

Can 2025 revenue exceed 22 billion yuan?
(year-on-year +69%)
Can overseas revenue share increase to 50%+?

Can the number of new S-level IPs be ≥2?
(Can Xiaoye and Xingxingren exceed 1 billion yuan?)
Can Member ARPU continue to increase?

Can IP derivative business revenue share exceed 10%?

###5.3 Core Risk Points

IP Lifecycle Risk
: Labubu’s popularity declines, new IPs fail to take over as expected
Aesthetic Fatigue Risk
: Generation Z preferences change rapidly, social attribute of blind boxes weakens
Overseas Expansion Risk
: Cultural adaptation, supply chain, cost control challenges
Valuation Overdraft Risk
: Market value already reflects high growth expectations; underperformance will lead to sharp decline
Industry Competition Intensification
: Competitors like TOPTOY and 52TOYS divert market share

Policy Regulatory Risk
:

  • 2023 Guidelines for the Regulation of Blind Box Operation Behavior (Trial) requires mandatory disclosure of key information and strengthened protection of minors
  • Policies in various provinces and cities show a pattern of ‘both regulation and innovation, linkage between local and international’ [6]
  • Future policies will focus more on cultural value excavation and global competition

###5.4 Investment Advice

Long-Term Holding Logic
:

  • Pop Mart has evolved from a ‘blind box company’ to an ‘IP ecological platform’
  • Systematic operation capability is the core barrier, with strong replicability
  • Overseas market space is broad, growth ceiling not yet reached
  • IP ecological expansion will open new valuation space

Short-Term Attention
:

  • Whether H2 2025 and H1 2026 growth rates can maintain 50%+
  • Performance of new IPs (Xiaoye, Xingxingren, etc.)
  • Overseas store efficiency and new store count
  • Progress of IP derivative business (parks, games, content)

Target Price
(Based on average target price of HKD354.87 from 28 analysts, upside potential of77.26%) [5]:

  • Optimistic Scenario
    (overseas exceeds expectations): Target price HKD185-470, corresponding to 2025 PE40-50x
  • Neutral Scenario
    (meets expectations): Target price HKD160, corresponding to2025 PE35x
  • Pessimistic Scenario
    (overseas underperforms): Target price HKD120, corresponding to2025 PE25x

Current Price
: Approximately HKD200 (closing price of HKD200.20 on December27,2025) [5]

Advice
: Long-term buy, short-term wait-and-see. Focus on whether 2026 growth rate can maintain50%+ and new IP performance.


VI. Conclusion: Value Reassessment from ‘Emotional Consumption’ to ‘IP Infrastructure’

Can Pop Mart achieve continuous evergreen IP output like Tencent Games? My answer is:

Different paths, but same destination
.

  • Tencent Games
    extends the lifecycle of a single IP to 10+ years through virtual content and social fission
  • Pop Mart
    achieves continuous growth through multi-IP matrix and global expansion, using ‘multiple short-cycle IPs’

The core is not whether a single IP can be evergreen, but whether

systematic capability can continuously incubate new IPs
. Pop Mart has proven it has replicable IP incubation capability (5 S/A-level IPs in7 years), which is the real moat.

For investors, the key is to shift from speculative thinking of ‘betting on hits’ to long-term thinking of ‘investing in IP infrastructure’. Pop Mart’s valuation framework should shift from PEG/PE to a comprehensive logic of

IP company × consumer goods × global premium
, with target market value space of HKD800-1200 billion.

The investment logic of the trend toy track is essentially a double bet on

Generation Z emotional consumption
and
Chinese cultural出海 (going global)
. In an era of scarce emotional value, whoever can capture the minds of young people and continuously soothe anxiety will hold the ‘pricing power’ of the industry.


References

[1] Gilin API Data - Pop Mart 2025 Interim Results Report
[2] Xueqiu - Honor of Kings: Business Insights from 10-Year Evergreen Growth (https://xueqiu.com/8321460154/331626014)
[3] Sina Finance - Labubu to Pop Mart is like Honor of Kings to Tencent Games

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Insights are generated using AI models and historical data for informational purposes only. They do not constitute investment advice or recommendations. Past performance is not indicative of future results.