Trump's Economic Growth Strategy Expands to Venezuela and Greenland: Geopolitical and Resource Implications

The Trump administration’s foreign policy approach has entered an aggressive new phase centered on resource acquisition and hemispheric dominance. On January 3, 2026, U.S. forces conducted “Operation Absolute Resolve,” resulting in the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in Caracas [1][2]. This military action has been followed by a coordinated strategy to secure economic control over Venezuela’s oil reserves and pressure Denmark and Greenland for control of the Arctic territory’s rare earth minerals, estimated at 36-42 million metric tons [3].

President Trump has framed this approach as essential to national security, stating, “We need Greenland from a national security situation… If we don’t do it, Russia or China will take over Greenland. And we’re not going to have Russia or China as a neighbour” [4]. This strategy has been characterized by analysts as the “Donroe Doctrine,” merging Trump’s name with the historical Monroe Doctrine to signal aggressive hemispheric dominance [3][4].

The administration announced on January 9, 2026, that U.S. oil companies have pledged a $100 billion private investment to rebuild Venezuelan oil infrastructure, with Venezuela agreeing to hand over up to 50 million barrels of crude oil immediately on an indefinite basis [2]. The Trump administration will maintain control over which companies operate in Venezuela, creating a significant restructuring of the nation’s energy sector. Industry analysts note that this arrangement positions the United States to dominate Venezuela’s petroleum output while private capital bears the infrastructure investment risk [1][2].

The immediate economic benefit cited by the administration centers on gasoline prices, which have dropped to $1.92-$1.99 per gallon from previous levels of $3.50-$5.00, representing a significant consumer-facing victory [2]. However, the long-term stability of these arrangements depends entirely on the political situation following Maduro’s removal and the willingness of oil companies to commit capital in a high-risk operating environment.

The administration’s pressure on Greenland represents a more complex geopolitical challenge. Greenland, an autonomous territory of Denmark, is a founding member of NATO, and threatening military action against a NATO ally creates unprecedented alliance cohesion risks [3][4]. White House officials have confirmed that “military force is always an option” when questioned about potential annexation methods [4][5].

The economic case for Greenland annexation centers on its rare earth mineral reserves, which constitute the world’s second-largest supply after China [3]. However, mining experts and industry analysts have raised significant concerns about the feasibility timeline, with realistic extraction requiring 10-15 years minimum and infrastructure development costs estimated at “hundreds of billions” over decades [3]. The absence of existing mining infrastructure, combined with the harsh Arctic environment and local Greenlandic resistance to development, creates substantial implementation challenges that may not align with the administration’s stated timeline expectations.

The potential strain on NATO alliance cohesion represents perhaps the most significant long-term consequence of this policy approach. Denmark has been a NATO member since 1949, and threatening military action against a founding ally undermines the foundational premise of collective defense [4]. European allies have expressed alarm at the prospect of U.S. military coercion against a democratic partner, with implications extending beyond the immediate Greenland question to broader trust in U.S. security commitments [3][4].

China and Russia represent potential beneficiaries of any NATO rift, with both nations maintaining significant Arctic interests and the capacity to exploit alliance divisions [5][6]. The strategic calculation appears to accept short-term alliance strain in exchange for long-term resource control, though the wisdom of this tradeoff remains subject to significant debate among foreign policy experts.

The administration’s strategy reveals a fundamental prioritization of direct resource access over traditional alliance structures. By framing Greenland acquisition as a national security imperative necessary to prevent Chinese or Russian influence, the policy positions any opposition as inherently unpatriotic. This approach represents a significant departure from postwar U.S. foreign policy, which emphasized alliance maintenance as a cornerstone of national security.

The tension between these objectives becomes particularly acute when considering that Denmark’s cooperation would be essential for any smooth transition of Greenlandic sovereignty. Military coercion against a NATO ally would not only violate treaty obligations but potentially trigger Article 5 complications for U.S. forces stationed across European allies. The strategic logic assumes that economic and diplomatic pressure will achieve results without requiring military action, though the administration’s rhetoric has left ambiguity about acceptable endgame scenarios.

The Venezuela arrangement demonstrates an innovative approach to funding foreign policy objectives through private capital mobilization. By structuring the $100 billion investment as private funding rather than government expenditure, the administration has created political insulation against criticism of taxpayer resource commitment [2]. However, this approach also transfers significant risk to oil companies while concentrating control in the executive branch through administrative determination of which entities may operate in Venezuela.

The revenue sharing structure remains opaque, with unclear terms governing distribution between U.S. interests, successor Venezuelan governance, and international oil companies. This ambiguity creates uncertainty that may dampen investment enthusiasm despite the substantial resource potential.

The Greenland focus highlights fundamental vulnerabilities in U.S. rare earth supply chains, with China currently dominating global processing capacity. Even successful acquisition of Greenlandic mining rights would not immediately resolve supply chain dependencies, given the 10-15 year development timeline estimated by experts [3]. The gap between stated policy objectives and realistic implementation timelines creates execution risk that may not be adequately reflected in current strategic planning.

The analysis reveals several risk factors warranting attention from security and business stakeholders:

The potential for NATO alliance damage from threatening military action against Denmark represents a strategic risk that extends far beyond the immediate Greenland question [3][4]. European allies may reassess U.S. reliability as a security partner, with implications for defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, and collective response capabilities. This risk appears elevated given the administration’s willingness to publicly threaten military force against a democratic ally.

The Venezuela military operation establishes a precedent for unilateral U.S. action against sovereign governments that may invite reciprocal pressure or encourage adversarial moves globally [5]. The combination of demonstrated willingness to use military force and expressed territorial ambitions creates an unpredictable international environment that complicates business planning across multiple sectors.

Both Venezuela and Greenland present significant regulatory obstacles to resource extraction. Venezuelan political instability post-Maduro may generate compensation claims and operational disruptions, while Greenlandic resistance and environmental opposition could delay development indefinitely despite political control changes [3].

Successful implementation of the Venezuela arrangement would significantly enhance U.S. energy security, reducing dependence on OPEC supplies and providing leverage in international energy markets [1][2]. The $100 billion investment commitment, if realized, would rebuild production capacity that has degraded during years of sanctions and political instability.

Greenland’s rare earth reserves offer potential diversification away from Chinese dominance, addressing a critical vulnerability in advanced manufacturing, defense systems, and clean energy technologies [3][6]. While development timelines are extended, the long-term strategic value of reduced Chinese rare earth leverage justifies sustained investment attention.

The immediate reduction in gasoline prices to $1.92-$1.99 per gallon demonstrates tangible consumer benefits from the Venezuela approach [2]. These benefits provide political capital that may support continued aggressive foreign policy implementation.

The following information synthesis supports stakeholder decision-making based on the analytical findings:

Venezuelan oil operations are transitioning to U.S. control following Maduro’s capture, with 50 million barrels of immediate crude delivery and $100 billion in private investment commitments [2]. The administration maintains administrative control over operating entities, creating a structured but high-risk investment environment.

Danish and Greenlandic authorities firmly oppose annexation, with no indication of willingness to negotiate territorial transfer despite pressure [4][5]. Military option acknowledgment by the White House confirms coercion as active policy, though implementation timeline and authorization status remain unclear.

Mining experts assess Greenland resource development costs at “hundreds of billions” over decades, with realistic extraction requiring 10-15 years minimum [3]. These timelines significantly exceed typical political planning horizons and create execution risk.

Denmark’s NATO membership creates legal and diplomatic complications for any military approach, though the administration has not退缩 from pressure tactics despite alliance implications [3][4].

European allies have expressed alarm at the trajectory of U.S. policy, with trust and reliability concerns extending beyond the immediate Greenland question [4]. China and Russia are positioned to exploit any alliance divisions resulting from the current approach [5][6].

Several critical details remain undisclosed, including specific terms of Venezuela oil revenue sharing, Greenland annexation action timelines, congressional authorization status for military options, Denmark’s formal response, and exact mineral extraction cost projections [3]. These gaps introduce uncertainty that stakeholders should incorporate into risk models.