In-Depth Analysis of Shanghai Premium Wine (600696): Plummeting Number of Dealers and Business Model Crisis

Based on the latest data and market information, I have conducted a systematic analysis of the financial status and business model of Shanghai Premium Wine (ST Rocks, 600696).

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Shanghai Premium Wine Co., Ltd. (Stock Abbreviation: ST Rocks, Stock Code: 600696) is a baijiu (Chinese liquor) enterprise that has experienced over 30 years of ups and downs in the capital market. Originally listed in 1993 as Haosheng Co., Ltd., the company has undergone multiple business transformations and capital maneuvers, including forays into real estate and internet finance, before officially entering the baijiu sector in 2019 and adopting its current name. Due to being repeatedly designated as a special treatment (ST) stock and then having the designation lifted, it has been dubbed the ‘Undead Bird of A-Shares’ by the market.

However, this ‘Undead Bird’ myth is coming to an end. On the evening of January 12, 2026, the company released its 2025 performance forecast. Preliminary calculations show that the company’s 2025 annual operating revenue is expected to be below RMB 300 million, and the lower of its profit-related indicators is negative, which clearly triggers the financial-based mandatory delisting threshold under the Shanghai Stock Exchange Stock Listing Rules [1][2]. The company’s shares have entered the mandatory delisting risk zone, and its delisting is almost a foregone conclusion.

Financial Indicator	2023	2024	2025 (Forecast/Actual)	YoY Change
Operating Revenue	Over RMB 1.6 billion	RMB 285 million	< RMB 100 million (RMB 34.76 million in the first three quarters)	-82.5% YoY in 2024
Net Profit	Over RMB 87 million	Approximately -RMB 217 million	Approximately -RMB 112 million (first three quarters)	Sustained Losses
Number of Dealers	4,429	772	Not Disclosed	82.6% Decrease

According to financial analysis data, the company’s current price-to-book ratio (P/B) is only 3.36x, but this valuation level is difficult to be supported by fundamentals given the continuously deteriorating business performance [0]. More importantly, the company’s current ratio is only 0.42, and its quick ratio is only 0.08, indicating severe insufficiency in short-term solvency and an imminent liquidity crisis.

The latest data on the company’s Free Cash Flow shows a figure of -RMB 91.058 million, with its cash flow situation continuing to deteriorate [0]. As of the end of September 2025, the company’s monetary funds have dwindled to only RMB 13.1397 million, which is insufficient to cover its short-term borrowings of RMB 252 million and non-current liabilities due within one year of RMB 6.4455 million, resulting in significant short-term debt repayment pressure [1]. Meanwhile, the company’s inventory amounts to as much as RMB 476 million, accounting for 24.31% of its total assets, but inventory clearance efforts have yielded minimal results, with a YoY decrease of only 9.51%.

The number of dealers plummeted from 4,429 in 2023 to 772 in 2024, an 82.6% drop. The direct trigger for this phenomenon is the collapse of related enterprise HAIYIN WEALTH. In December 2023, HAIYIN WEALTH was placed under investigation for suspected illegal fund-raising, leading to a capital chain rupture. Affected by this, Shanghai Premium Wine faced temporary liquidity pressure due to the centralized repayment of loans to its controlling shareholder, and failed to timely redeem rebates and market expenses to dealers, triggering a mass exodus of dealers [1].

The exodus of dealers is not just a short-term capital issue, but also reflects a fundamental collapse of trust in the channel system. Han Xiao, the actual controller, was taken into criminal coercive measures by public security authorities in 2024, and all shares held by the controlling shareholder and concerted actors have been judicially frozen [1]. This series of events has severely damaged dealer confidence, leading to extreme caution in their attitudes towards replenishing stocks.

In terms of channel revenue, the company’s core dealer segment revenue recorded a 79.32% YoY drop in 2024. Meanwhile, channels such as group purchasers and online direct-operated stores have all experienced varying degrees of decline, forming a resonant contraction across multiple channels [1].

The business model of Shanghai Premium Wine is essentially a “light asset operation + channel expansion” model, which mainly relies on:

1. Dealer Network
   : Attracting dealers to quickly distribute products through high rebate policies
2. Brand Marketing Investment
   : Building brand awareness through large-scale market promotion
3. Collaboration with Related Financial Business
   : Importing high-net-worth customer resources through HAIYIN WEALTH’s wealth management business

The core vulnerability of this model lies in its excessive reliance on channel policies and related resource transfers, rather than product strength and brand loyalty.

The plummet of dealers from 4,429 to 772 means that the company’s painstakingly built national channel network has substantively collapsed. Channel construction in the baijiu industry requires long-term investment and trust accumulation, and once lost, it is extremely difficult to rebuild.

The company’s total revenue dropped by 82.50% YoY to RMB 285 million in 2024, and its operating revenue in the first three quarters of 2025 was only RMB 34.76 million, a YoY decrease of 84.92% [1][2]. This cliff-like decline has far exceeded the reasonable range of industry cyclical fluctuations, pointing to a fundamental failure of the business model.

Monetary funds of only RMB 13.13 million vs. short-term liabilities of RMB 257 million, a gap of over RMB 240 million [1]. The company has lost its self-hematopoietic ability and is completely dependent on external funding to maintain operations.

The RMB 476 million inventory accounts for 24.31% of total assets, but inventory clearance efforts have yielded minimal results. The sauce-flavor baijiu market continues to slump, similar base baijiu has failed to sell at judicial auctions, and the rental price of cellars has halved compared to the peak in 2021 [1]. Inventory has turned from an “asset” into a “burden”.

The company has attempted to rescue itself through live e-commerce, but its Douyin account has only gained over 4,200 followers; its shift to the corporate custom baijiu market has also struggled to gain traction due to weak brand strength [1]. This indicates that the brand itself has extremely limited market appeal without the push of channels.

Based on the above analysis, the business model of Shanghai Premium Wine has substantively collapsed. This collapse is not a simple cyclical adjustment, but a fundamental failure of its business logic:

1. Revenue Collapse
   : The collapse of the channel network has rendered the sales system inoperable
2. Rigid Costs
   : High rebate policies cannot be sustained, and brand investment has been drastically cut
3. Deteriorating Assets
   : Inventory devaluation and rising risk of accounts receivable bad debts
4. Credit Break
   : Risk events involving the actual controller have completely destroyed market trust

According to the Shanghai Stock Exchange Stock Listing Rules, if the company’s audited 2025 annual report confirms that its operating revenue is below RMB 300 million and its profit indicator is negative, the company’s shares will be delisted due to triggering financial-based delisting conditions. In addition, the company’s 2024 annual financial report was issued with a qualified opinion with “material uncertainty related to going concern”. If the 2025 annual financial report is again issued with a qualified opinion, disclaimer of opinion, or adverse opinion, the company will also trigger delisting conditions [2][3].

From the perspective of secondary market performance, the company’s stock price has fallen from a historical high of RMB 51.66 to RMB 3.04, with its market value shrinking to approximately RMB 1 billion, a decline of over 80% [1][3]. In the countdown to delisting, the company has attempted multiple rescue measures such as inventory clearance, live e-commerce, custom baijiu, and base baijiu liquidation, but all have yielded minimal results. As the delisting risk is fully exposed, these rescue efforts have become a tragic race against time.

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[1] Eastmoney.com - Caifuhao, “The Undead Bird Myth Will End, Shanghai Premium Wine Enters Delisting Countdown”, January 14, 2026, https://caifuhao.eastmoney.com/news/20260114112604958434970
[2] StockStar.com, “ST Rocks Issues Delisting Warning, Stock Price Drops by Over 80%”, January 13, 2026, https://wap.stockstar.com/detail/IG2026011300026173
[3] StockStar.com, “600696, Delisting Alert Triggered!”, January 12, 2026, https://www.stcn.com/article/detail/3588225.html
[4] Jinling AI Financial Database, Financial Analysis and Company Overview Data, January 14, 2026