South Korea-Taiwan Cooperation on US Chip Tariffs: Implications & Analysis

On November 24, 2025, South Korea’s Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo announced that South Korea sees room for cooperation with Taiwan to navigate U.S. semiconductor tariffs imposed by the Donald Trump administration. This statement comes amid South Korea’s recent trade deal with the U.S. (which includes a clause linking its tariff terms to Taiwan) and reports that U.S. officials are considering delaying long-promised semiconductor tariffs. Taiwan’s trade negotiations with the U.S. are ongoing, with semiconductors currently excluded from existing 20% tariffs on Taiwanese exports to the U.S.

• South Korea’s Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo stated: “Taiwan is also in negotiations, so there is room for South Korea and Taiwan to get the most favourable treatment through cooperation” [1].
• South Korea’s recent U.S. trade deal includes a clause: semiconductor tariffs on South Korea will be “no less favourable than terms that may be offered in a future agreement covering a volume of semiconductor trade at least as large as South Korea’s” (referencing Taiwan) [1].
• U.S. officials are privately considering delaying semiconductor tariffs, a centerpiece of Trump’s economic agenda [1].
• Taiwan’s U.S. trade negotiations are ongoing: its exports face a 20% tariff, but semiconductors are currently excluded [2].
• South Korea’s semiconductor exports to the U.S. rose 51.2% to $1.2 billion in October 2025 (driven by AI chip demand) [1].

The potential cooperation between South Korea and Taiwan reflects shared incentives to mitigate U.S. tariff risks. Both are global semiconductor leaders: Taiwan accounts for ~63% of global manufacturing revenue, South Korea ~18% [2].

South Korea’s U.S. trade deal benchmarks its tariff terms against Taiwan, creating alignment incentives. By cooperating, they can leverage combined market power to negotiate better terms [1].

The reported U.S. tariff delay (a response to supply chain concerns) provides a window for collaboration. The U.S. relies heavily on South Korea and Taiwan for advanced semiconductors, making tariff disruptions costly [1].

Taiwan’s ongoing talks are critical: its 20% U.S. export tariff excludes semiconductors, but future tariffs are a threat. Cooperation with South Korea is a strategic move to protect this key industry [2,4].

• South Korea/Taiwan
  : Cooperation could stabilize exports (e.g., South Korea’s 51.2% October growth) by reducing tariff uncertainty [1].
• U.S.
  : A tariff delay avoids short-term supply chain disruptions but may weaken Trump’s economic nationalist agenda [1].
• Global Supply Chain
  : Stabilized tariffs reduce uncertainty for AI/tech industries dependent on advanced semiconductors [3].
• Regional Dynamics
  : Cooperation aligns with the Chip4 Alliance (U.S., Japan, SK, Taiwan) to reduce Chinese tech dependency [3].

• Market Dominance
  : Taiwan (~63%) and South Korea (~18%) lead global semiconductor manufacturing [2].
• SK-U.S. Deal
  : Tariff terms for SK are benchmarked against Taiwan [1].
• Taiwan’s Tariff Status
  : 20% on U.S. exports (semiconductors excluded) [2].
• U.S. Tariff Delay
  : Officials are considering pushing back semiconductor tariffs [1].

1. No concrete details on how South Korea and Taiwan plan to cooperate (e.g., joint negotiation teams, data sharing).
2. Taiwan’s official response to South Korea’s cooperation proposal is unavailable.
3. Exact timeline for U.S. tariff delay decisions is unknown.
4. Specific terms of Taiwan’s ongoing U.S. trade negotiations (beyond current exclusions) are not detailed.

[1] Reuters. (2025, November 24). South Korea sees room for cooperation with Taiwan on US chip tariffs, trade minister says. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-sees-room-cooperation-with-taiwan-us-chip-tariffs-trade-minister-2025-11-24/ (crawled via Crawl4AI).
[2] Reuters. (2025, October 31). Taiwan reports progress on trade talks with US after officials meet at APEC. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-reports-progress-trade-talks-with-us-2025-10-31/.
[3] Taiwan International Studies Quarterly. (2025,秋季號). The Chip4 Alliance and Technological Geopolitics. Retrieved from https://www.tisanet.org/quarterly/202509/4 河凡植 20250818 cfspiwu.pdf.
[4] TCN. (2025, November 4). Trump’s tariffs spell trouble for Taiwan’s economy. Retrieved from https://www.tcn.tw/news/6749696.